Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

Robert Radakovich, Ellen R. Radakovich, The
Robert Radakovich Marital and Family Trust v.
Mattie Cornaby, Al Cornaby, The William Argyle
Conaby Trust and Mattie Cornaby Trust, Jay
Barney Cornaby, Dale Barney, Gaylene C.
Rosenthal, and Albert Cornaby : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
D. Scott Crook; Scott M. Ellsworth; Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC; David Maddox; Attorneys for
Appellants.
John H. Romney; Jeffs and Jeffs; Attorneys for Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Radakovich v. Cornaby, No. 20050911 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6071

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT RADAKOVICH, individually, and
ROBERT RADAKOVICH and ELLEN R.
RADAKOVICH, Trustees of THE ROBERT
RADAKOVICH MARITAL AND FAMILY
TRUST,
Plaintiffs/Appellees,

Appellants'
Reply Brief

v.

MATTIE CORNABY and AL CORNABY,
individuals, and THE WILLIAM ARGYLE
CORNABY TRUST and MATTIE
CORNABY TRUST, and JAY BARNEY
CORNABY, DALE BARNEY, GAYLENE C.
ROSENTHAL, and ALBERT CORNABY,
Trustees,

Case No. 20050911
District Court No. 020700486

Defendants/Appellants.
Appealfrom a Decision of the Seventh Judicial District Court
Judge Bryce K. Bryner
D. Scott Crook (7495)
Scott M. Ellsworth (7514)
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC

John H. Romney
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo,Utah 84601

215 South State Street, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Tel. (801)413-1600
Fax (801) 413-1620

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees

David Maddox (2044)
9160 South 300 West, Suite 6A
Sandy, Utah 84070
Tel. (801) 446-3788
Fax (801) 365-7215
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
Cornaby et al.

APR 0 3 200S

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT RADAKOVICH, individually, and
ROBERT RADAKOVICH and ELLEN R
RADAKOVICH, Trustees of THE ROBER i
RADAKOVICH MAIMTM. ANDFAM!'
TRUST,
Plaintiffs/Appellees,

Appellants'
Reply Brief

v.
MA

!

i! I U K :

U- I.

ui..

.. i

individuals. a«- '
r. . • i
CORNABY
CORNAB^ IRl SI dtki JAY BARNEY
CORNABY !- LL BARNEY, GAYLENEC.
ROSENTHAL, and ALBERT CORN A m
Trustees,

Case No. 20050911
District Court No. 020700486

Defendants/Appellants.
Appeal/:

' - decision of the Seventh Judicial District Court
Judge Bryce K. Bryner
D. Scott Crook (7495)
Scott M.Ellsworth (7514)
SMITH HAH I \ KJSKN, I»I,I.*

John H. Romney
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo, Utah 84601

215 South State Street, Suite 650
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Tel. (801) 413-1 (*"•
Fax (801) 4H 1^ J

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees

David Maddox (2044)
9160 South 300 West, Suite 6A
Sandy, Utah 84070
Tel. (801)446-3788
Fax (801) 365-7215
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
Cornaby et al.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
ARGUMENT
I.
THE MOTION TO RECONSIDER SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED

1
2
3
3

A. The Trial Court Did Not Fix a Location for the Right-of-Way
3
B. The Failure to Fix a Right-of-Way is a Reason Justifying Relief from the
Summary Judgment Order
6
1. The Cornabys Did Identify A Reason Justifying Relief
7
2. The Cornabys Presented Facts and Arguments Supporting the Reason to the
Trial Court
7
3. The Radakoviches Have Failed To Explain Why Failing to Fix a Location of a
Right-of-Way is Not a Reason Justifying Relief.
8
4. The Motion Was a Proper Motion
8
II.
THE CORNABYS ARE APPEALING ONLY THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
III.
THE CORNABYS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR RIGHT TO FILE A MOTION TO
RECONSIDER
CONCLUSION
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
ADDENDUM

4816-7844-9920.CO 010.001

10
13
15
16
17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bonneville Billing & Collection v. Torres, 2000 UT App 338, 15 P.3d 112
12
Egidi v. Libertyville, 621 N.E.2d 615 (111. App. Ct. 1993)
4
Evans v. Board of County Commissioners of Utah County, 2004 UT App 256, 97 P.3d
697
4
Evans v. Board of County Commissioners of Utah County, 2005 UT 74, 123 P.3d 432 ... 5
Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177 (Utah 1998)
13, 14
Franklin Covey Client Sales v. Melvin, 2000 UT App. 110, 2 P.3d 451
10
In re Adoption of Baby K, 967 P.2d 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
9
J. V. Hatch Const, Inc. v. Kampros, 971 P.2d 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
9
Kunglerv. O'Dell, 855 P.2d270 (UtahCt. App. 1993)
7
Mitchell v. Chance, 149 S.W.3d40 (Term. Ct. App. 2004)
4
Nigohosian v. Nigohosian, 2004 UT App. 116, 2004 WL 797721
14
Oseguera v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 UT App 46, 68 P.3d 1008
7
Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650 (Utah 1994)
9
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
9
Rules
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b)
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(a)
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)
UtahR. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)
UtahR. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)
UtahR. Civ. P. 60(b)(3)
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)

12
12
9
9
6, 9, 10, 11,15
10, 11
10, 11
10, 11
6

Other Authorities
Bruce, Jon W., & Ely, James W., Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in and, ^
7.02[2][a] (rev. ed. 2000)
Corbin on Contracts, § 4.1 (rev. ed. 1993)
Moore, James Wm. et al., 12 Moore's Federal Practice § 60.68[3] (3d ed. 1999)

Aoit no A A nmn nrs nin nm

5
5
11

Page 2

ARGUMENT
I.

T H E MOTION T O RECONSIDER SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED

A.

The Trial Court Did Not Fix a Location for the Right-of- Way

In their brief, the Appellees (hereinafter "Radakoviches") tacitly admit that the
order granting summary judgment, which they prepared and which the trial court judge
signed, is fatally defective. Although they attempt to claim that the width, length, and
location of the right-of-way are "clear and need[] no 'clarification,'" the Radakoviches
also acknowledge that, during oral argument on the motion to reconsider, they offered to
have "Cornaby locat[e] the placement of fences marking the sixty foot wide right of
way."

(Appellee's Brief at 33-34.)

The transcript of the hearing reveals the

Radakoviches' offer:
Now, they've brought this motion for reconsideration coupled with a
motion to clarify. I think this is much ado about nothing. We know that
there is a road. A road exists. The order which Counsel - which the
defendants reviewed before it was signed says that a right-of-way should be
60 feet from the entrance to its exit. Now essentially it's a straight line.
If the defendants are unwilling to cooperate in the placing of these
fences to mark the 60-foot right-of-way, the Court should do what many
Courts typically do; and we'd be happy to provide a surveyor to mark the
middle of the road from top to bottom, and measure 30 feet on each side, if
the defendants insist on a meets and bounds description. That's the easiest
way to settle it; and it's not a problem. It's commonly done.
(R. at 476, 31-32.)
The Radakoviches cannot consistently maintain the supposed "clarity" of the
right-of-way at issue when they have openly admitted (a) that the order granting
summary judgment offers no description locating the right-of-way and (b) that the order
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must therefore be clarified before the boundaries of the right-of-way may be located. The
Radakoviches even went so far as to suggest a surveyor locate the right-of-way because
the order left the matter unclear. Given that the Radakoviches had expressly requested
that the Court "define[] [the right-of-way] by metes and bounds" {see R. at 34) because
they claimed to "have attempted to arrange for fences to be built to mark the 60 foot wide
right of way, but have been prevented from doing so by the [Cornabys]," (R. at 50), it is
remarkable that they now claim an order setting forth only the most nebulous references
as to the location of a right-of-way, without any legal description at all, nevertheless
constitutes a "clear" judicial order granting them the relief they requested.
As discussed in the Cornabys5 original brief, both this Court and the Utah
Supreme Court have recently addressed the very issue raised in Radakoviches' Amended
Complaint. Evans v. Board of County Commissioners of Utah County, 2004 UT App
256, 97 P.3d 697, a case decided by this Court, turned on the validity of a reserved
easement the location of which was not described in the original reservation. The trial
court had ruled the easement invalid, but this Court reversed, explaining that "[t]he
failure of an easement description to specify details, such as the exact location ... does
not render the easement excessively vague or unenforceable." 2004 UT App 256, \ 10
(quoting Egidi v. Libertyville, 621 N.E.2d 615, 622 (111. App. Ct. 1993)).1

1

Relevant to the present dispute was this Court's observation that "[w]hen a deed
creating an easement explicitly refers to an existing road, the courts commonly construe
the location and dimensions of the intended easement to conform with the location and
dimensions of the road." 2004 UT App 256, ^[12 (quoting Mitchell v. Chance, 149
S.W.3d 40, 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)). In the present case, of course, the trial court did
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The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision. See Evans v. Board of County
Commissioners of Utah County, 2005 UT 74, 123 P.3d 432.

The Supreme Court

characterized the judicial function in unfixed easement cases as an exercise similar to
contractual "gap-filling." Id. (citing Corbin on Contracts, § 4.1 (rev. ed. 1993)).
Ultimately, after considering the necessity of ensuring that judicial gap-filling does not
alter the scope of the servitude bargained for, id. at ^f 19, the Supreme Court adopted an
approach that places the power to locate an unfixed servitude in the owner of the servient
estate, id. at ^20. Under this "practical approach to the problem," the Supreme Court
observed,
the owner of the servient estate is entitled to designate a reasonable location
for the easement. If the servient owner fails to make such a designation
within a reasonable period, the easement holder may select a reasonable
route. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, a court may specify a
location for the easement.
Id. at ]|21 (quoting Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and
Licenses in Land, \ 7.02[2][a] (rev. ed. 2000)). This arrangement for the placement of an
unfixed servitude, the Court concluded, "removes the issue of whether location selection
is an essential term from the field of battle with neither side sustaining injury." Id. at 19.
In the present dispute, the Cornabys have denied the existence of a 60-foot
easement and resisted the Radakoviches' unilateral attempts to fix the location of the
easement. In response, the Radakoviches brought this action requesting the trial court to
fix the location of the easement. The trial court did not do so. Thus, the Cornabys'

not construe the right-of-way to conform with the dimensions of the existing road, but
instead redefined the existing road to conform with its reading of the right-of-way.
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quarrel is not with the enforcement of an unfixed right-of-way, but with the trial court's
failure to have fulfilled its gap-filling duty under the Evans rule. Given that Cornaby and
Radakoviches cannot reach an agreement as to the situation of the right-of-way, the trial
court's duty was to specify a location. This, however, the trial court utterly failed to do,
and, the Cornabys, seeking to repair the omission, brought the Motion to Clarify and/or
Reconsider.
B.

The Failure to Fix a Right-of-Way is a Reason Justifying Relief from the
Summary Judgment Order

The Cornabys argued in their brief that the trial court abused its discretion when it
did not reconsider its summary judgment order to fix the boundaries of the underlying
right-of-way. In response, the Radakoviches repeatedly claim that the Cornabys "never
presented any facts showing 'extraordinary circumstances' which could purportedly
justify a Motion to Reconsider." (Appellee's Brief at 17; see also id. at 11, 12, & 18.)
They also claim that the Cornabys "did not present the trial court with the available
evidence [of the irreconcilable right-of-way descriptions] which [they] now seek[] to
present on appeal." (Id. at 26-27.) They also repeatedly claim that the Cornabys "never
provided any 'reason' to justify relief to the trial court. (Id. at 17; see also id. at 11, 12.)
Finally, they claim that "[although the Appellants' Brief generically refers to Rule
60(b)(6), [the Cornabys] fail[] to cite any Rule 60(b) 'reason' justifying the Motion to
Reconsider." (Id. at 18; see also id. at 24.) This description of the underlying procedural
history is demonstrably inaccurate.
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The Cornabys Did Identify A Reason Justifying Relief

As the Cornabys noted, cited, and folly discussed on pages 17 and 18 of their
Appellants' Brief, a mistaken easement description in a judgment constitutes a "reason
justifying relief from the operation of [a] judgment." See Kungler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d
270, 274-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). This specific case and its reasoning were also
presented, briefed, and argued to the trial court. {See R. at 441-44.) Moreover, in their
Appellants' Brief, the Cornabys pointed out that, because the mistake in failing to define
the easement was due to the mistakes of the court, the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to correct the judgment.

(See Appellants' Brief at 18 (citing Oseguera v.

Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 UT App 46, f 12, 68 P.3d 1008).)

The Radakoviches' claim,

therefore, that the Cornabys never identified any reason justifying relief is inaccurate, at
best.
2.

The Cornabys Presented Facts and Arguments Supporting the
Reason to the Trial Court

The Radakoviches are equally inaccurate in their claim that the Cornabys did not
present evidence to the trial court demonstrating the problem with the order. The trial
court had before it a picture almost identical to the picture incorporated into the
Cornabys' Appellants' Brief at page 6 (see R. at 289, 294), together with a plotted legal
description of the right-of-way described in the relevant deeds (see R. at 405). Not only
were these pieces of evidence in the record, but the deeds themselves were in the record
as well. (See R. at 169, 117.) Additionally, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Memorandum Decision of the 1968 Seventh District Court case identifying the
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properties, the right-of-way, and the respective legal descriptions of each were before the
trial court too. (See R. at 110-12, 119-24). And, the Cornabys specifically argued that
the descriptions were irreconcilably in conflict and that the Cornabys could not identify
where the right-of-way was to be measured from. (See R. at 347-48; 442-44 476, 7-9, 1314, 16-19.) The Radakoviches, moreover, responded explicitly to these arguments. (See
R. at 382-83; 476, 31-32.) The Radakoviches, once again, cannot rationally assert the
absence of arguments to which they have expressly addressed responses. Rational or not,
however, the Radakoviches are, at best, simply incorrect to assert that the Cornabys did
not raise the issue with, or present facts to, the trial court relating to the irreconcilability
issue.
3.

The Radakoviches Have Failed To Explain Why Failing to Fix a
Location of a Right-of- Way is Not a Reason Justifying Relief

What is most significant about the Radakoviches' arguments is that they never
point to any case law or other argument suggesting that a trial court's failure to specify
the easement's location is not a reason justifying relief. The closest they ever come is
their statement in the oral argument referenced in part LA. above that they would be
willing to allow the Cornabys to fix the location of the easement. But this, of course,
being an admission that the Cornabys' requested clarification was justified, actually
militates against the Radakoviches' unsupported assertions to the contrary.
4.

The Motion Was a Proper Motion

Somewhat related to the arguments raised about the Cornabys' alleged failure to
identify the reason justifying relief is the Radakoviches' implicit argument that, because
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the Cornabys did not identify until oral argument the exact Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
(URCP) permitting a motion to reconsider, the motion was somehow improper. As the
Cornabys argued in response to the Radakoviches motion for summary disposition,
however, while it is true that the URCP does not include a provision on motions for
reconsideration, it is entirely irrelevant since it is equally true that the URCP nowhere
forbids such a motion. To the contrary, in J. V. Hatch Const, Inc. v. Kampros, 971 P.2d 8
(Utah Ct. App. 1998), this Court rejected the argument that the Rules' silence regarding
motions to reconsider rendered such motions per se improper:
We quickly dispose of [the] argument that [the] motion for reconsideration
was inappropriately before the trial court because no such motion exists
under the rules of civil procedure. While that much is true, a motion so
titled may still be properly heard if it could have been brought under a
different rule, i.e. Rules 54(a), 59(a), or 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, but was improperly characterized.
Id. at 11 (citing Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 n.4 (Utah 1994)
(emphasis added)). A (mis)characterization of the Cornabys' Motion to Clarify and/or
Reconsider—whether in the caption or the text of the supporting memorandum—as
falling without the ambit of the URCP is thus of no moment, as it is well established that
"[i]t is "the substance . . . of a motion [that] is dispositive in determining the character of
the motion." In re Adoption of Baby K, 967 P.2d 947, 949 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(quoting Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)).
Since the substance of the Cornabys' Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider is relief from
judgment on the grounds of the trial court's failure to clarify its award of a right-of-way,
the Cornabys' Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider falls squarely within the scope of the
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provisions of URCP Rule 60(b).2
II.

THE CORNABYS ARE APPEALING ONLY THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.

The Radakoviches repeatedly argue in their brief that the Comabys are attempting
to circumvent the Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure by arguing the underlying
merits of the summary judgment order rather than arguing the district court's order on
motion for reconsideration. Of course, as this Court is aware, this very issue was argued
when the Radakoviches sought summary disposition and lost. (A copy of this Court's
Order denying the motion for summary disposition is appended as Tab A in the
Appendix.)
As the Comabys pointed out in response to the Radakoviches' motion for
summary disposition, and as fully attested in their Appellants' Brief, the Comabys do not
seek to have this Court revisit the trial court's summary judgment order (although they
naturally wish that the decision had been otherwise—such is the nature of litigation).
Indeed, the Cornabys are well aware of the impropriety of attempting by means of a 60(b)
motion to circumvent the rules governing appeals. See, e.g., Franklin Covey Client Sales
v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, ^ 9, 2 P.3d 451. InFranklin Covey, the defendant, Melvin,
after the dismissal of his untimely appeal, filed two motions for relief from judgment:
one on the grounds of mistake, under Rule 60(b)(1), and one on grounds of newly
discovered evidence, 60(b)(2), and misrepresentation, 60(b)(3).

2

Upon their denial,

This argument, of course, should come as no surprise to the Radakoviches since
the Cornabys clearly made the argument in the Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum
filed prior to the Court's order being entered. (See generally R. at 448-57.)

Melvin appealed his two 60(b) motions. Unfortunately for Melvin, his 60(b) fa9ade
could not conceal what was, in reality, a transparent attempt to improperly revisit issues
in the underlying judgment which the tardiness of his original appeal had barred him
from addressing.
The Court was not fooled, however, and noted at the outset the limited scope of
appellate review of the denial of 60(b) motions:
An appeal of a Rule 60(b) order addresses only the propriety of the denial
or grant of relief. The appeal does not, at least in most cases, reach the
merits of the underlying judgment from which relief was sought. Appellate
review of Rule 60(b) orders must be narrowed in this manner lest Rule
60(b) become a substitute for timely appeals. An inquiry into the merits of
the underlying judgment or order must be the subject of a direct appeal
from that judgment or order.
2000 UT App 110 at ^[19 (quoting 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice
§ 60.68[3] (3d ed.1999)) (emphasis omitted).

Focusing accordingly, the Court

discovered that Melvin's 60(b)(1) motion did not address inadvertent clerical errors, but
sought to review mistakes of law.

The "proper avenue to redress mistakes of law

committed by the trial judge," the Court pointed out, is "an appeal or motion for new
trial, rather than a 60(b) motion." Id. at %L\. Melvin's second motion, held by the Court
to be meritless, presented no new evidence to satisfy the requirements of Rule 60(b)(2)
nor any hint of the misrepresentation needed to trigger relief under 60(b)(3). Id. at Tfl[2628.
Unlike Mr. Melvin's pretended 60(b) motions, however, turning back to the
present dispute, the Cornabys' appeal of the rejection of the Motion to Clarify and/or
Reconsider does not challenge the understanding or application of the law as set forth in
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the trial court's summary judgment order.3 Rather, the appeal is of the trial court's abuse
of discretion in refusing to resolve an incomprehensibility.
As noted in the Cornabys' Appellants' Brief, the trial court's order, in short,
essentially grants to Radakoviches a right-of-way, 60 feet wide (based upon the spurious
deed description) along the length of the existing fenced right-of-way (which has not
historically been of a uniform 60-foot width throughout), without bothering to specify
where this 60 feet is to be measured from. In this, the trial court erred grievously. Are the
parties to measure the mandated 60 feet, for instance, as 30 feet on either side of the
centerline of the existing access road? or 60 feet from the eastern boundary? or 30 feet on
either side of a line drawn at the whim of the Radakoviches? This point, unaddressed by
the trial court, should be the main priority in a dispute over the location of an undescribed
right-of-way.
In short, the Radakoviches have been granted a 60-foot right-of-way which is
Here it should be noted that the Appellees' reliance on Bonneville Billing &
Collection v. Torres, 2000 UT App 338, 15 P.3d 112, is similarly inapposite. In
Bonneville, the plaintiff openly sought to use the appeal of a motion to reconsider to
attack the findings entered as part of a default judgment, "contending this [was] the only
means to present the issues for appeal," id. at f3. The Court properly dismissed the
appeal on jurisdictional grounds: a motion seeking to alter or amend findings must be
brought as a Rule 52(b) motion to amend findings or a Rule 59(e) motion to amend
judgment. Such motions must be filed within ten days of the challenged findings or
judgment. Bonneville's motion, however, was filed 46 days after default judgment was
entered.
In the present case, however, the Cornabys are not attempting Bonneville's backdoor approach to challenging the underlying judgment on appeal. Moreover, the
Cornabys' Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider is plainly not a Rule 52(b) motion, since
it does not challenge the trial court's findings; it seeks instead to discover a way to reify
what is otherwise an Order with which no one can reasonably comply. (And in any event,
summary judgment's do not have "findings," merely "a brief written statement of the
ground[s] for its decision . . . . " URCP Rule 52(a).)
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undefined. The end result of the confusion created by the summary judgment order is
that the parties will end up back before a judge seeking some sort of explanation. In
order to avoid that inevitability, the Cornabys filed the Motion to Clarify and/or
Reconsider, asking the trial court to clarify what it meant in its findings, conclusions, and
judgment. The Cornabys cannot understand the Radakoviches' vehemence against such
critical clarification, nor the trial court's apparent belief that clarification is unnecessary,
but the Cornabys feel bound to seek some kind of remedy for this conundrum while it is
still remediable. Nevertheless, the Cornabys seek review only of the trial court's decision
not to render such clarification as they asked for in their Motion to Clarify and/or
Reconsider; they do not ask this Court to address the underlying judgment.
III.

THE CORNABYS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR RIGHT TO FILE A MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

The Radakoviches, citing Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177 (Utah 1998), also claim
that the Cornabys waived their right to bring the motion to reconsider because the
Cornabys allegedly "assented . . . without objection" to the "form of the Summary
Judgment Order" before it was entered by the trial court. (Appellee's Brief at 29.)
However, Evans v. State is clearly inapposite to this case.
In Evans v. State, the Plaintiffs filed petitions to quash administrative civil
investigative demands (CIDs) issued by the Antitrust Division of the State of Utah. Id. at
179. At the hearing on the motions, the trial court ruled from the bench that the State had
not met its burden to establish "probable cause" for the issuances of the CIDs. Id. at 180.
However, the statutorily imposed burden for the issuance of a CID was merely
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"reasonable cause." Id. Despite the trial court's ruling, the Plaintiffs prepared an order
that stated the State failed to establish reasonable cause. Id. The State did not object to
the proposed order despite this inclusion of the language inconsistent with the trial
court's oral ruling. See id. Because the State had failed to object to the written order as
inconsistent with the trial court's oral findings, the Supreme Court ruled that "the State
waived its right to challenge the order in this regard on appeal." Id. The Court based its
holding upon the standard that it applies in such cases: "Regardless of the language used
during the hearing, the language in the court's final written order controls, and we will
presume the order is correct unless affirmatively shown otherwise." Id. In 2004, this
Court succinctly explained the Evans v. State decision: "To preserve for appeal the issue
of whether the written order of the court is in conformity with what transpired on the
record, a party must first object to the form of the documents pursuant to [URCP 7(f)]."
Nigohosian v. Nigohosian, 2004 UT App. 116, 2004 WL 797721, at *1 (citing Evans,
963 P.2d at 180). (A copy of the unpublished decision of the Court is appended to this
brief as Tab 2.)
The Evans v. State rule, however, is clearly does not apply to the present dispute.
The Cornabys do not claim any disparity exists between the conclusions of the court on
the record and the final documents the Radakoviches prepared. In fact, because the trial
court's ruling did not include any finding as to the location of the right-of-way, the
documents prepared by the Radakoviches—which likewise fail to delineate the right-ofway's location—could not conflict with the trial court's decision. {Compare R. at 300
with R. at 304-09.) Instead, the Comabys simply claim that the Order and Findings &
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Conclusions, which clearly reflect the trial court's ruling, are impossible to enforce and
must be reconsidered. Accordingly, the Cornabys did not waive their right to bring a
motion for reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's denial of the Cornabys' Rule 60(b) (6) Motion to Clarify and/or
Reconsider constituted a clear abuse of discretion. For the reasons given herein, the
Cornabys respectfully request that this Court (1) reverse the trial court's August 31, 2005,
Order denying the Cornabys' Motion, (2) set aside the judgment, and (3) remand this
matter to the trial court with instructions that it specifically identify the location of the
right-of-way at issue.
DATED

this V * day of April, 2006

sott Crook
Scott M. Ellsworth
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC

Attorneys for Defendants
David Maddox
Attorney for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this » ft ^ day of April, 2006,1 caused to be sent via firstclass U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellants'
Reply Brief, addressed as follows:
John H. Romney
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo,Utah 84601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

D. sStt Crook
Scott M. Ellsworth
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC
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ADDENDUM
The following documents are attached:
Order Denying Motion for Summary Disposition,
Case No. 20050911-C A (Utah Ct. App, Nov. 29, 2005)
Nigohosian v. Nigohosian,, 2004 UT App 116, 2004 WL 797721
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Robert Radakovich,
individually, and Robert
Radakovich and Ellen R.
Radakovich, Trustees of the
Robert Radakovich Marital and
Family Trust,

ORDER

Case No. 20050911-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Mattie Cornaby, Al Cornaby,
individuals, William Argyle
Cornaby Trust and Mattie
Cornaby Trust, Jay Barney
Cornaby, Dale Barney, Gaylene
C. Rosenthal, Albert Cornaby,
Trustees
Defendants and Appellees.

Before Judges Davis, Orme, and Thorne.
This matter is before the court on Appellees' motion for
summary disposition. Appellees argue that this court lacks
jurisdiction to hear this appeal because Appellants' notice of
appeal was untimely. See Utah R. App. P. 10(a) (1) .
Appellants filed a "motion to clarify and/or reconsider" on
March 11, 2005. The trial court denied this motion on August 31,
2 005. Appellants subsequently filed a notice of appeal on
September 28. Appellants claim that the "motion to clarify
and/or reconsider" was filed pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellants also concede that they only
appeal from the denial of this motion.
We construe the "motion to clarify and/or reconsider" as a
motion filed pursuant to rule 60(b)(6). See Utah R. Civ. P.
60(b)(6). Therefore, the appeal from the denial of this motion
was timely filed. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). While the appeal is
necessarily narrow in scope, see Franklin Covev Client Sales;

Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110,119, 2 P.3d 451, this court has
jurisdiction to decide it.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for summary disposition
is denied.
DATED this

xP* day of November, 2005

A

FOR THE COURT:

William A, Thorne Jr., Jud

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on November 29, 2005, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the parties listed below:
JOHN H ROMNEY
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 N 100 E
PO BOX 888
PROVO UT 84603-0888
DAVID MADDOX
ATTORNEY AT LAW
9160 S 300 W STE 6A
SANDY UT 84070
D. SCOTT CROOK
SCOTT M ELLSWORTH
SMITH HARTVIGSEN PLLC
215 S STATE ST STE 650
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
Dated this November 29, 2005.

Deputy Clerk
Case No. 20050911
District Court No. 020700486
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Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 797721 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 116
(Cite as: 2004 WL 797721 (Utah App.))

UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
RULES BEFORE CITING.

CHECK

COURT

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Margaret NIGOHOSIAN, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Robert NIGOHOSIAN, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20020606-CA.
April 15,2004.
Third District, Salt Lake
Honorable William B. Bohling.
Douglas G.
Appellant.

Mortensen,

Salt

Department;

Lake

City,

The

BENCH,

GREENWOOD,

and

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM:
*1 Husband appeals the decree of divorce and
supporting findings of fact and conclusions of law
signed and filed by the court. He asserts on appeal
that the documents are not in conformity with the
agreements stated on the record at a pretrial hearing
before the court.
In February 2002, the trial court held a pretrial
hearing in this divorce case. At the hearing, the
parties reached agreement on many key issues and
stated the agreements on the record. Wife's counsel
was assigned to prepare documents reflecting the
result of the hearing.
Wife's

counsel served

a divorce

decree

Husband timely filed a notice of appeal. He also
filed a motion to set aside the judgment, or to
correct clerical error, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(a) and (b). [FN1] In both his rule 60
motion and appeal, Husband asserts that the
documents entered by the trial court do not conform
to what transpired on the record in the February
hearing.

for

Jay L. Kessler, Magna, for Appellee.
Before Judges
ORME.

supporting findings of fact and conclusions of law
on Husband's counsel, accompanied by a signed
certificate of service. Receiving no timely
objections to the documents, the trial court signed
the documents. The documents were filed with the
clerk on June 19, 2002.

and

FN1. A trial court has jurisdiction to
consider a motion under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) while an appeal is
pending. See Baker v. Western Sur. Co.,
757 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
Husband's rule 60 motion was a
proceeding separate from the proceedings
leading to the divorce decree appealed in
this case. This court's "power of review is
strictly limited to the record presented on
appeal." Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT
99,K 16, 17 P.3d 1110. Although some
confusion exists among the parties, the
record of the proceedings in the parallel
rule 60 motion is not before this court on
the appeal of the divorce decree, and is not
considered for the purposes of this appeal.
Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration
provides that counsel for a party obtaining a ruling
shall draft and file with the court a "proposed order,
judgment, or decree in conformity with the ruling."
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-504(l). Copies of the
proposed documents must be served on the
opposing party. See id. R4-504(2). The opposing
party must notify the court and counsel of any
objections to the documents within five days of

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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(Cite as: 2004 WL 797721 (Utah App.))
service. See id. This presents opposing counsel with
the opportunity to review proposed documents and
assure that they are "in conformity" with what
transpired in court. Id. R4-504(l).
Husband waived his opportunity to challenge on
appeal whether the decree, findings of fact, and
conclusions of law were in conformity with the
agreements reached on the record in the February
hearing because he failed to object timely to the
form of the documents under rule 4-504. See Evans
v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 180 (Utah 1998). To
preserve for appeal the issue of whether the written
order of the court is in conformity with what
transpired on the record, a party must first object to
the form of the documents pursuant to rule 4- 504.
See id. (holding State waived issue of inconsistent
language in court's written order because of failure
to timely object to the language under rule 4-504).

entered on the record, not sufficiency of
the evidence. Dugan is thus inapplicable.
*2 Furthermore, as a factual matter, Husband has
not affirmatively shown that the decree and findings
of fact and conclusions of law were inconsistent
with what transpired at the hearing in February
2002. See Evans, 963 P.2d at 180 (stating appellate
courts will presume language in trial court's order is
correct unless affirmatively shown otherwise).
Husband offers conclusory and
self-serving
statements that the parties' intent was different than
what is reflected, supported only by his own
proposed amended documents. Additionally, one of
his challenges to the documents, the waiver of
past-due amounts and attorney fees, appears clearly
set forth in finding of fact number 24 and
conclusion of law number 19.
Accordingly, we affirm.

Husband argues that he did not waive the issue of
the conformity of the documents to the record. He
asserts that his trial attorney explained why there
were no timely objections filed at a motion hearing
on October 25, 2002. However, that hearing is part
of the subsequent rule 60 proceeding and is not
before this court.

Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 797721 (Utah
App.), 2004 UT App 116
END OF DOCUMENT

Husband also argues that there was no waiver
because the documents did not have an "approved
as to form" line signifying review and approval.
However, implying the necessity of an approval line
is contrary to the rule. The rule squarely places the
burden to object, not to approve, on counsel, with a
prescribed time in which to do so. See Utah Code
Jud. Admin. R4-504(2). [FN2]
FN2. Husband also asserts that no
objection to the documents was necessary
to preserve appeal under Dugan v. Jones,
724 P.2d 955 (Utah 1986). Both Dugan
and rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure state that no trial objection is
necessary to preserve for appeal a question
of sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
finding. See Dugan, 724 P.2d at 956. Here,
however, the challenge is to the conformity
of the documents with the stipulations
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

